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ABSTRACT 
Prior research on federal court judges suggests that their judgments are not made solely 
on legal principles, but on the basis of political ideology and “strategic anticipation” of the 
actions of reviewing courts.  This study seeks to empirically test the role these factors play in 
Federal District Court decisions involving the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001.  The results indicate 
that both political policy preference and strategic anticipation have an effect on the judicial 
decisions of U.S. District Court judges.  Due to statistical complications, however, it was not 
possible to determine their relative effects on the outcomes of Patriot Act cases.  
INTRODUCTION    
The USA PATRIOT ACT is one of the most significant pieces of federal legislation of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century.  Since it was enacted in 2001, Federal District Court 
judges have heard dozens of cases applying the provisions of the Patriot Act.  With each 
interpretation, judges shape the statute’s meaning.  Therefore, it is important to understand 
the factors that influence these judicial decisions.   
Over the past 65 years, political scientists have theorized and empirically examined the 
ways in which federal judges make decisions (Bowie and Zorn 2010).  The majority of scholars 
have come to reject the notion that federal judges mechanically make decisions based strictly 
on legal rules (Carp and Rowland 1996).  Alternatively, a considerable amount of literature 
suggests judges make decisions based on their ideological preferences (the “attitudinal model”) 
and, depending on their position within the judicial hierarchy, “strategic anticipation” of the 
reactions of appellate courts (the “hierarchical model”).   No research (to the best of my 
knowledge) has attempted to apply these models to U.S. District Court judges’ decisions on the 
Patriot Act.   
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Using an originally constructed dataset, this study examines the roles of ideology and 
strategic anticipation in judicial decisions involving the United States Patriot Act.  The results 
indicate that ideology and strategic anticipation each have an effect on the judicial decisions of 
U.S. District Court judges, however, because of statistical issues, it was not possible to estimate 
the relative importance of these factors.    
THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
On October 26th, 2001, in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United 
States’ 107th Congress passed the USA Patriot Act with the purpose of preventing domestic and 
foreign acts of terrorism. The title is an acronym for Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (EPIC Online).  Since its 
enactment, federal and state law enforcement agencies have employed key provisions of the 
statute to investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals for both terror and non-terror related 
criminal offenses.  These provisions are considered integral parts of homeland security.     
 In 2002, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) sought to highlight several 
substantive features of the Patriot Act.  Their report states, 
The Act gives federal officials greater authority to track and intercept communications, 
both for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes.  It vests the 
Secretary of the Treasury with regulatory powers to combat corruption of U.S. financial 
institutions for foreign money laundering purposes.  It seeks to further close our borders 
to foreign terrorists and to detain and remove those within our borders.  It creates new 
crimes, new penalties, and new procedural efficiencies for use against domestic and 
international terrorists (Doyle 2003: 1).   
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 The “new procedural efficiencies” include roving wiretaps, court ordered searches of 
business records, and the authorization to conduct surveillance of certain non-U.S. citizens 
engaged in foreign terrorism, known as “lone wolves” (U.S. Government Online).  A 2009 
Congressional hearing described the method of a roving wiretap as a way to use a single 
wiretap order to track several methods of communication, which may include a landline, cell 
phone, or computer.  Roving wiretap operations have been used in several national security 
and intelligence investigations (U.S. Government Online 2009). 
Another provision allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation to seek court orders 
through the Foreign Intelligence Service Court (FISA), for purposes of gaining governmental 
access to “tangible” information regarding foreign intelligence and international terrorism (U.S. 
Government Online 2009).  This provision ensures the secrecy of an operation while obtaining 
authorization from the FISA court.  The “lone wolf” provision permits the surveillance of 
individuals who have no ties to an agent of foreign power or a terrorist organization (Liu 2011.)  
The Congressional Commission dubs these single actors as “modern day terrorists” who may 
subscribe to a terror related dogma, but not to any particular terrorist group.  Such people are 
considered to be central to the threat of modern terrorism. 
The Patriot Act has faced opposition from civil liberties organizations and activists, who 
argue that its provisions encroach on fundamental constitutional rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure protected by of the Fourth Amendment.  Those opposing the 
constitutionality of the law include the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC).  Both organizations have brought class action civil challenges 
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to federal court in several instances.  Despite opposition, a Congressional Subcommittee of the 
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives has continued to extend key sunset 
provisions that were due to expire in 2005, 2006, 2009, and 2011 (Justice Information Sharing 
Online 2012).   
Congress, however, is not the only branch of government to provide oversight of the 
Act, for the federal courts have encountered the Patriot Act regularly.  When new legislation is 
introduced, the judiciary has the responsibility to determine its meaning and to apply it on a 
case-specific basis in an adversarial process.  In addition to interpreting legislation such as the 
Patriot Act, judges must also determine whether provisions of the law curtail substantive rights 
of individuals and exercise the power of judicial review, which is, “…The power to review 
government acts for their compatibility with the nation’s constitution and strike down those 
acts that are not compatible” (Epstein 2010: 14). 
One of the fundamental goals of social science research on the courts is to explain the 
outcome of cases through understanding the determinants of the judicial decision.  Since its 
passage in 2001, the Patriot Act has been applied in dozens of cases decided by federal courts, 
and the goal of this paper is to understand the outcomes in these decisions, specifically 
decisions reached by the United States District Courts.  In order to do so, this paper begins by 
developing a model of the judicial decision.   
EXPLAINING JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
The traditional understanding of the judicial decision making process has been referred 
to by political scientists as the “legal model.” This model assumes that judges make decisions 
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within a legal framework, applying legal rules to facts on a case specific basis (Baum 2008: 10).  
These rules, which are established by constitutions, statutes, and prior court decisions, are 
interpreted by judges applying rules of legal interpretation such as the plain meaning of the 
text, legislative history, and stare decisis.  According to the legal model, the best explanation for 
the outcome of a case is the set of reasons given by the judge(s) who decided it. 
While some scholars and judges suggest that these rules can be applied mechanistically 
to deduce a “correct” result in each case1, more sophisticated approaches allow for a greater 
degree of flexibility and judicial discretion.  Tarr (2010), for example, claims that the legal 
decision involves two phases.  The first phase is “discovery”, where a judge initially determines 
the proper resolution of the case.  The second phase, “justification,” is when the judge provides 
the reasoning for his or her decision through written opinion (Tarr 2010).  This process, scholars 
suggest, contains an unavoidable element of rule creation (Baum 2010).  This sophisticated 
model does not force a judge to reach a conclusion based on the law itself, causing scholars to 
be skeptical of the validity of the legal model.  
 Perhaps the strongest reason to reject the legal model is the rate of judicial dissent.  
Since 1940, approximately 70 percent of all Supreme Court cases have included written dissents 
(Goff 2005: 483).  Thus, Supreme Court justices infrequently unanimously agree or disagree on 
a case.  Moreover, in the U.S. Supreme Court, cases are often decided by a 5-4 vote.  Brian Goff 
claims, “Over the past 60 years, about one in every six cases and sometimes more than one out 
of every four cases hinged on the ballot of a single justice” (Goff 2005: 483).  That is, five 
                                                          
1
 Justice Scalia is known for his “textualist” approach to deciding cases.  He explains, “I take the words as they are 
promulgated to the people of the United States, and what is the fairly understood meaning of those words” (Scalia 
1996 in Epstein 2010: 25). 
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Supreme Court justices upheld or struck down an appealed decision, while four justices reached 
a conclusion opposite to the majority. 
 This high rate of dissent is difficult for the legal model to explain.  If the justices are 
given the same case, set of facts, and rules of law, and if the law determines the outcome of the 
case, one would expect they would more frequently reach the same conclusion.  Instead, 
justices given the same case, facts, and rules of law frequently reach different outcomes.  If one 
wishes to explain this variation, one must look beyond the law itself.  
Political scientists have attempted to explain this variance in Supreme Court decisions 
by developing the “attitudinal model” of the decision process.  The attitudinal model attributes 
judicial decisions to the justices’ preconceived political or ideological preferences.  In short, 
conservative judges vote conservatively, and liberal judges vote liberally (Baum 2008).  Thus, 
judges’ behavior is not based on principles of law or legal interpretation, but on judges’ 
personal ideological beliefs and preferences (Rowland and Carp 1996).  
Proponents of the attitudinal model typically begin by identifying some judicial 
outcomes as “liberal” and others as “conservative.”  In criminal cases, for example, a judge with 
a liberal policy perspective would be relatively sympathetic to the defendant and his or her 
procedural rights (Baum 2010), while a judge holding conservative ideals would place a greater 
emphasis on the criminal justice system and its capacity to fight crime (Baum 2010).  Likewise, 
in civil liberties cases, “liberal” outcomes favor liberties claimants, where “conservative” 
outcomes do not support civil liberties claimants (Segal and Cover 1989).  According to this 
framework, decisions upholding the government power over an individual in Patriot Act cases 
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would be conservative, where decisions that are unfavorable to the government would be 
liberal.   
Because a judge’s political ideology cannot be directly observed, researchers have used 
a judge’s political party as a proxy for their political ideology, with judges belonging to the 
Republican Party being identified as conservative, and judges belonging to the Democratic Party 
as liberal.  This practice has been repeated by a number of social scientists2. 
Daniel Pinello, for instance, finds that in federal courts, party is a strong factor in judicial 
decision making.  In fact, party explains almost half of the variance in a judge’s decision (Pinello 
1999).  He states, “…conventional wisdom today among students of judicial behavior sees party 
as a dependable yardstick for ideology: Republican judges are conservatives; Democrats, 
liberals” (1999: 2). In a recent study, Epstein, Landes and Posner also use judges’ parties in 
order to determine their political ideologies (2013).  Similarly, Linda Camp Keith states, “The 
justices’ party identification has demonstrated its strength as a surrogate for policy preferences 
in numerous Supreme Court and lower court studies” (2008: 142).   
                                                          
2 One alternative to party that has been used is the Segal Cover Score, which seeks to support 
the attitudinal model by measuring the ideological values of Supreme Court justices through 
independent measures of behavior of the justice prior to being confirmed by the Senate majority (Segal 
et al. 1989).  Segal and Cover analyzed content within four different newspapers, two with a liberal 
perspective and two with a conservative stance.  Researchers determined whether the article was 
liberal, moderate, or conservative.  Researchers found a strong correlation among the ideological values 
of justices reported by newspaper articles and their votes within the Supreme Court on similar issues.  
According to the Segal Cover Score, judicial policy preference significantly explains justice’s voting 
behavior (Segal et al. 1989).  However, Segal-Cover scores are not available for District Court judges. 
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Existing research on the attitudinal model predominately focuses on United States 
Supreme Court justices and it can be argued that justices’ positions within the court of last 
resort gives them the attitudinal freedom to implement their personal policy preferences to a 
greater degree than other judges (Segal et al. 1993).  This freedom begins with the process of 
case selection.  With almost total discretion to grant or deny certiorari, justices can hear the 
cases in which they are most interested.  In addition, scholars argue that members of the 
Supreme Court are more likely to pursue, “…their policy goals because they lack electoral or 
political accountability, ambition for higher office, and comprise a court of last resort that 
controls its own jurisdiction” (Segal et al.1993: 234).  Impeachment and removal of a justice, 
while theoretically possible, has never occurred.  The Supreme Court is thus subject to little 
control or oversight by other political actors, allowing justices to implement their policy goals 
without much opposition (Segal et al. 1993).    
Several of the features that enhance the applicability of the attitudinal model to the 
United States Supreme Court do not apply with the same force to other courts. In particular, 
the lack of ambition for higher office, control over the court’s docket and, especially, the lack of 
a higher reviewing court, are unique to the Supreme Court.  Therefore, before specifying any 
expectations about the behavior of District Court judges, it is appropriate to consider to what 
degree we should expect the attitudinal model to apply to those courts. 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 
Compared to the United States Supreme Court and the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
Federal District Court judges have been paid limited empirical attention by judicial scholars.  
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This is surprising, considering that Federal District Courts make up a large portion of the federal 
judiciary and play an essential role in the federal judicial system.  There are a total of 94 Federal 
District Courts located throughout the country, with one court per judicial district.  As of March, 
2013, there were 677 District Court judges, as compared with 179 Courts of Appeals judges, and 
9 Supreme Court Justices (U.S. Courts Online).  Thus, the number of District Court judges is 3.8 
times greater than the number of Courts of Appeals judges, and 75.2 times greater than the 
number of Supreme Court justices (U.S. Courts Online).   
District Court judges hear many more cases than their superiors.  They decide 6.9 times 
as many cases as the Courts of Appeal and about 3000 times as many as the Supreme Court 
every year (Espstein, Landes and Posner 2013: 208).  Though appellate courts have an 
important role in declaring the law and setting precedent, lower courts “play a far more 
important role in the actual lives of citizens than the Supreme Court” (Caminker in Boyd and 
Spriggs 2009: 48). 
District Courts are not only important to the individual litigants in the cases they hear.  
They also serve a policy making function (Boyd et. al. 2009).  Through the cumulative effect of 
decisions such as sentencing, District Court judges have a large impact on policy.  As Lynn 
Mather notes, “the accumulation of similar individual decisions defines policy just as much as 
one major decision” (Mather in Boyd et al. 2009: 43).   
The implementation of law is another primary role of the Federal District Courts.  
District Court judges have been responsible for making decisions on, 
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Integration of our schools; the availability of abortions; standards for defining 
obscenity; the quality of air we breathe and the water we drink; requirements for 
affirmative action programs; and standards for maintenance of our prisons, public 
hospitals, and mental institutions (Carp and Rowland 1996). 
An example of District Courts implementing law took place after the Supreme Court case, 
Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483 (1954) as discussed in Boyd et al. 2009).  In the 
Supreme Court’s decision, the Court designated District Courts to handle problems of 
desegregation as long as their decisions were non-discriminatory and consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s original opinion (Carp and Rowland 1996).   
Finally, Boyd and Spriggs claim that District Courts also provide a form of “filtering duty” 
for appellate courts, essentially managing a large number of cases and filtering those bound for 
appellate courts (2009).  Prior research shows 20 percent of District Court cases will be 
reviewed by Courts of Appeals, though less than 1 percent will eventually be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court (Randozzo 2008).   
The process of appointing Federal District Court judges is similar to the process of 
appointing Justices of the United States Supreme Court.  They are nominated by the President, 
and must be approved by a Senate vote.  The Office of Legal Policy, located within the Justice 
Department, and the Office of the White House Counsel frequently meet in the Judicial 
Selection Committee to discuss the possible nominations of judicial candidates (Baum 2008).  If 
a candidate is agreed upon, the candidate is to be cleared through the president and undergoes 
an extensive investigation conducted by the Office of Legal Policy and the FBI (Baum 2008).  If 
   McCarthy 11      
considered appropriate, the president will approve the candidate once again before the vote 
goes to the Senate (Baum 2008). 
Like justices of the United States Supreme Court, once they have been approved by a 
simple majority Senate vote, District Court judges enjoy lifetime appointments and can be 
removed only by impeachment.  Also like the justices, their salaries cannot be reduced.  This 
ensures a certain degree of judicial independence similar to that of the United States Supreme 
Court.  Thus, with similar safeguards as Supreme Court justices, District Court judges would 
seem to be free to make decisions based on their political ideological preferences. 
Research bears out this expectation.  A study by Carp and Rowland measuring the 
partisanship of Federal District Courts from 1933-1977 showed that district judges appointed by 
Democratic presidents ruled liberally 48 percent of the time, while judges appointed by 
Republicans voted liberally only 39 percent of the time (1983). Similarly, Pinello finds party as a 
reliable indicator of judicial voting in the District Courts.  In a meta-analysis, Pinello synthesized 
the results of 84 studies in order to test this link.   Of the 16 studies involving District Courts, 11 
found an effect.  Two studies found that party has a strong effect on the outcomes of District 
Court cases, another two cases found a moderate effect, seven studies found a small effect, 
and five found a negative effect (Pinello 1999: 6). Thus, political party is a reliable predictor of 
these judges’ votes, though the effect is somewhat smaller than that for the Supreme Court.          
Despite theoretical and empirical support for the notion that partisan ideology 
influences the decisions of District Court judges, there are several reasons to believe this 
influence will be less pronounced than it is for the justices of the Supreme Court.  The first of 
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these reasons has to do with the differences in the appointment process.  Though the president 
is unlikely to select a candidate with a differing political ideology, he may be forced to select a 
candidate with a more moderate stance due to the tradition of Senatorial Courtesy.  This term 
refers to a practice where, 
…a presidential nomination to a federal position within a state requires senate 
confirmation, the Senate as a whole gives deference to the wishes of the senators from 
that state—very strong deference to a home state senator of the president’s party 
(Baum 2008: 100).  
Research has shown that state senators and local political factors are just as important 
in the selection process as the, “values and attitudes of the president in whose name the 
appointment was made” (Carp et al. 1996).  Traditionally, if senators from a state did not 
approve of a nomination, it would not be considered by the Judiciary Committee.  If home-state 
senators did support the nomination, the nominee would quickly pass through the Judiciary 
Committee. 
Though the practice of senatorial courtesy has remained an important part of the 
appointment process, its significance has diminished over time.  Due to the partisan divide in 
Washington, home-state support does not automatically mean senate confirmation.  Since 
1980, senators have been more likely to oppose the appointment of nominees if they are of the 
opposing party.  This partisan divide has resulted in fewer judicial appointments and caused the 
average length of the appointment process to increase (Baum 2008).  As a result, the president 
is likely to nominate a person with a moderate stance rather than a heavily partisan stance in 
order to fill a judicial vacancy.   
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The second reason ideology may not play as much of a factor as it does for superior 
courts is that the decisions of the former are subject to appellate review (Bowie et al. 2010).  As 
previously noted, justices of the Supreme Court are free to act on their policy preferences in 
part because their decisions are not subject to review by a higher authority.  This is obviously 
not the case for the District Courts, whose decisions are subject to review by the Federal Courts 
of Appeals and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court.    
Indeed, the decisions of the district courts are subject to mandatory review by the 
United States Courts of Appeal.  That is, if criminal defendants and civil litigants wish to appeal 
their guilty or undesired verdict that a trial judge renders, they have the right to do so. 
Randozzo claims that, 
…as the courts of appeals effectively monitor a substantially higher percentage of trial 
court cases, and as appellate panels cannot selectively refuse to review an appeal, 
district court judges must essentially operate under the premise that their decisions are 
likely to be reviewed (2010: 675). 
Given the above, there is reason to think that District Court judges must balance their own 
ideological preferences against those of their appellate superiors (Randozzo 2010).   
Randozzo finds evidence of such a “strategic anticipatory” effect of appellate court 
ideology on District Court judges’ decisions.  That is, District Court judges that anticipate a fear 
of reversal will “…curtail their ideological proclivities and avoid a negative outcome on appeal” 
(Randozzo 2010: 685).  If, however, District Court judges believe they share a political 
preference with their Courts of Appeal, they will make decisions based on their political 
ideology (Randozzo 2010).   
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Other research supports some of Randozzo’s findings. Epstein, Landes, and Posner 
found that in the Eighth Circuit, a court that is overwhelmingly made up of judges that were 
appointed by Republican Presidents, the court  
reversed decisions by district judges appointed by Democratic Presidents at a 
significantly higher rate than those by district court judges appointed by Republican 
Presidents (2013: 113).       
Thus, while there is some evidence that District Court judges do in fact rule on their ideological 
preferences, there is also strong reason to believe that District Court judges’ decisions are 
constrained by a “strategic anticipatory effect.”  
However, not all trial court decisions are appealed and, in fact, appeals are relatively 
rare.  A defendant or litigant’s decision to appeal is ultimately affected by, “strategy, costs, and 
anticipation” (Boyd and Spriggs 2009: 41).  If an appellant’s case is not strong or there is an 
issue of funding, it is not wise for a defendant or litigant to appeal a decision.  Carp and 
Rowland find 20 percent of all District Court cases are appealed per year (1996).  In addition, 
“…the low rates of appeal and reversal ensure that only a very small number of district courts’ 
judgments will be reversed on appeal—about 3 percent” (Carp et al. 1996).  Thus, even when 
cases are appealed, the trial court is not likely to be reversed.   
To summarize, there are theoretical reasons to believe that ideology (as proxied by 
political party) of District Court judges affects the outcome of their decisions at trial level.  
Empirical research supports this, though findings suggest the effects appear to be weaker at the 
District Court level than at the Supreme Court level.  The evidence also supports the idea that 
the ideological effects of the District Court judges’ is bound by their anticipation of reversal, 
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particularly by a Court of Appeals where the majority of appeals judges possess a political 
ideology opposite of the trial judge.  This anticipatory effect, however, may be softened by the 
low likelihood of appeal.     
With evidence supporting both models, it is unknown whether ideology or strategic 
anticipatory effect best explains the behavior of District Court judges. It is possible both models 
could have an effect on judicial behavior.  Therefore, this study seeks to answer these unknown 
queries.   
HYPOTHESES 
In order to examine the influence the roles that ideology and “strategic anticipation” 
play in the decisions of Federal District Courts deciding cases involving the Patriot Act, I will test 
two main hypotheses.  First, that Federal District Court judicial decisions on the Patriot Act are 
correlated with judicial policy preferences of the judges as proxied by the political party of the 
appointing president. Specifically, I hypothesize that Republican judges will vote in favor of the 
U.S. government more frequently than will Democratic judges.  
The second hypothesis is that the ideological positions of the Circuit Courts to which 
District Court judges’ cases are appealed will affect their decision making on cases involving the 
Patriot Act.  The role of the District Court judges’ ideology will be affected by the ideology of 
their Circuit Court.  Specifically, District Court judges under a Republican Circuit Court will be 
more likely to vote in favor of the U.S. government, while District Court judges under a 
Democratic Circuit Court will be more likely to vote unfavorably towards the U.S. government.  
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DATA 
The analysis for this paper was based on an original dataset compiled by the author. 
Using the advanced search option on Lexis Nexis Academic District Court database, the terms, 
“USA PATRIOT ACT,” “PATRIOT ACT,” and, “UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY 
PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO PREVENT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM,” were 
searched for the dates between October 26th, 20013 and January 1st 2012.  Because the focus of 
this paper is on the tendency of judges to rule in favor of the government, the U.S. Government 
or one of its agencies was required to be a participating party.  This search yielded 136 cases.  
From these, cases were selected as part of the working sample if the court directly interpreted, 
or cited, a specific section of the Patriot Act, and if that interpretation was used by the court as 
a justification in deciding at least one of the issues in the case (Banks 2010).  Cases were 
excluded from the working sample if the court cited or discussed the Patriot Act but did not 
apply it.  Seventy three of the 136 cases met this criterion. 
 Twenty two cases were excluded from this analysis because they were decided by 
federal magistrate judges.  Federal Magistrates, “Serve as judicial officers of the U.S. district 
courts and exercise the jurisdiction delegated to them by law and assigned by the district 
judges” (Federal Judiciary Center Online).  Magistrates may hear any cases delegated to them 
by District Court judges, except those involving a felony.  The issue with Federal Magistrates, 
however, is that they are not appointed by the president.  Magistrates are, “…appointed by 
majority vote of the active (district) court” (U.S. Courts Online).  Since magistrates are not 
                                                          
3
 October 26
th
, 2001 marks the date Congress enacted the Patriot Act into law.  Thus, any Patriot Act cases 
subsequently followed.   
   McCarthy 17      
appointed by the President, determining their party affiliations is beyond the scope of this 
analysis.   
One issue that complicated the data gathering was the non-publication of many District 
Court decisions.  In 1972, the increasing workload on federal judges prompted the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to develop measures that would cut back on judges’ time.  
Federal judges were given the option to determine which decisions were worth publication, 
and which ones were not (Dikel and Jan Honigsberg 1988).  With an option to separate cases, 
judges published cases thought to be useful in the future, leaving out those considered 
repetitive of well known principles of law (Dikel et al. 1988).  If cases were not of precedential 
value, their publication was unlikely (Dikel et al. 1988).   Lexis Nexis Academic provides 
unpublished U.S. District Court decisions starting from June 21, 2005.  The database selectively 
includes unpublished decisions prior to June 21, 2005 (Lexis Nexis Online).  This analysis only 
includes cases that were included in the Lexis Nexis Academic database.   
The cases included in the sample involved several different types of issues, including 
terror prosecutions, non-terror related criminal prosecutions, civil cases, and immigration 
cases.  A case was coded as a terror prosecution if the court clearly stated the U.S. Government 
was actively prosecuting a suspected terrorist.  Terrorism cases often included defendants who 
were charged with providing material support to known terrorist organizations, such as the 
2007 case, United States v. Holy Land Foundation (U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50239).  Other terrorist 
prosecutions addressed suspected terrorists, such as Richard Reid, the infamous “shoe-
bomber.”  Non-terror related Patriot Act cases often included money laundering prosecutions, 
   McCarthy 18      
such as, U.S. v. $293,316 in U.S. Currency (2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25611).  Civil cases usually 
involved a dispute over a tort or contract breach.  One civil case, Miller v. U.S. Parole 
Commission (2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7325), involved a constitutionality dispute over the 
obtainment of a federal inmate’s DNA sample.  Immigration cases generally applied to 
deportation or visa issues.  Pierre v. McElroy (2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19982) exemplifies an 
immigration case concerning a suit over the naturalization process of a non-citizen.  
Graph 1 shows that, of the 51 cases, 14 are terrorism prosecutions, 21 are non-terrorism 
criminal prosecutions, 13 are civil cases, and 3 are immigration cases.  It is possible that the 
outcomes of these different types of cases are subject to different influences, which would be 
revealed by analyzing them separately.  The sample size, however, is too small to permit this 
and, therefore, this analysis combines all 51 cases. 
Graph 1: Description of Cases 
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The dependent variable for the analysis, Outcome, is the vote of the District Court judge.  
It was coded “1” when the district judge voted in favor of the position taken by the United 
States Government and “0” when the court ruled against the government. Two cases involved 
split decisions, where one case involved several separate issues on which the court was 
required to rule.  These cases involving multiple issues were split into separate cases in the data 
set.  
Two independent variables were measured.  The first independent variable is the 
ideology of the deciding judge, which was labeled District Court Party.  For reasons discussed 
earlier in this paper, this variable is operationalized by identifying the party of the judge’s 
appointing president, Democrat or Republican.  To determine the party of the appointing 
president, biographies of District Court judges were searched in the Federal Judiciary Center’s 
online database (FJC Online).  
The second independent variable, Court of Appeals Majority, measures the ideology of 
the Courts of Appeals in the Federal Circuit to which the District Court belonged at the time of 
each Patriot Act case.  This was also determined by party identification of the appointing 
president who appointed the majority of that court.  This variable was coded “1” if a majority of 
the judges on the Court of Appeals were appointed by a Republican, and “0” if a Democratic 
president appointed a majority of the judges.   
Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  Of the 51 cases included in the 
analysis, 68.6 percent4 had an outcome that was favorable to the government.  District Courts 
                                                          
4
 Percentages for outcomes provided were rounded to the nearest tenth. 
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ruled unfavorably towards the government 31.4 percent of the time.  These percentages are 
consistent with prior findings that the U.S. Government wins a majority of the cases it argues, 
regardless of the party of the judge.  For instance, Kritzer, Songer, and Sheean (2003) concluded 
that in the Federal Courts of Appeals, the government had a 70 percent overall success rate 
when participating as appellant or respondent.  This may be due to the greater resources that 
the government can bring to bear, including better lawyers and the ability to pay legal expenses 
such as fees for extensive discovery processes or expert witnesses (Kritzer et al. 2003).  
Government attorneys and prosecutors often have more experience in court than opposing 
parties (Kritzer, Songer, and Sheean 2003: 85), which also contributes to the high rate of 
government success.       
Table 1 shows that the cases are almost evenly split among Democratic and Republican 
District Court judges.  Of the 51 cases, Democratic judges presided 26 instances, while 
Republicans presided 25 times.  As shown in Table 2, District Court judges appointed by 
President Clinton accounted for 49 percent (almost half) of all District Court Judges.  District 
Court judges appointed by George W. Bush followed at 23.5 percent.  Those appointed by 
George H.W. Bush accounted for 13.7 percent, where those appointed by Reagan made up 11.8 
percent.  Only 2 percent of District Court judges were appointed by President Johnson, while 
none were appointed by Ford, Nixon, Carter, or Obama. 
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Finally, descriptive statistics in Table 1 also indicate 58.8 percent of the cases took place 
in District Courts that were under Republican Courts of Appeal, where 41.2 percent took place 
in District Courts with Democratic Circuit Courts of Appeals. 
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ANALYSIS 
Cross-Tabulations were used to test the first and second hypotheses.  The first 
hypothesis states Republican judges will vote in favor of the U.S. government more frequently 
than Democratic judges.  Thus, the cross-tabulation tests the relationship between District 
Court Party and Outcome.  The second hypothesis states District Court judges under a 
Republican Circuit court will vote in favor of the U.S. government, where District Court judges 
under a Democratic Circuit Court will vote unfavorably of the U.S. government. The cross-
tabulation will be used to examine the relationship between Court of Appeals Majority and 
Outcome.  A Chi-Square test will be used in order to measure the significance of the 
relationships. To test the strength of the association between the variables in both hypotheses, 
   McCarthy 23      
Phi Tests will be implemented.  Applying Phi is appropriate to test the effect size, considering 
the variables are binary and directional for both hypotheses (Arthur 2012).  In the case of two 
dichotomous variables, Phi is equivalent to Pearson’s r (East Carolina University Online).   
Results from the first cross-tabulation support the first hypothesis.  There is a strong and 
statistically significant relationship between Federal District Court judges’ party and the 
outcome of the District Court case.  The Chi-Square statistic was significant at the level of .02, 
which is well below the standard confidence level of .05, and indicates a probability of only two 
percent that the relationship between the two variables could have occurred by chance.  The 
Phi value of .325 indicates a strong relationship. 
Results of the cross-tabulation indicate that Federal District Court judges appointed by 
Republican presidents ruled in favor of the government on cases involving the Patriot Act 84 
percent of the time, while Democratic-affiliated judges ruled in favor of the government 53.8 
percent of the time.  Thus, the odds of Republican District Court judges supporting the 
government are 4.49 times greater than the odds for Democratic District Court judges.5  This 
finding supports the first hypothesis, which states that conservative judges are more likely to 
rule in favor of the government in cases involving the Patriot Act.  One may thus tentatively 
conclude that ideology, represented in this case by the political party of the deciding judge, 
indeed has an effect on a Federal District Court judge’s decision making on cases involving the 
Patriot Act.  It is worth noting that these findings are in line with those of Pinello, Carp, and 
Stidham cited above, that ideology influences the votes of District Court judges.  
                                                          
5
 This odds ratio is calculated by the formula: p1q2/p2q1, where p1 is the probability of a Democratic 
judge ruling in favor of the government, p2 is the probability of a Republican judge doing the same 
q = (1-p1) and q2 = (1-p2). 
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A brief comment is needed here to avoid possible confusion.  Seeing that decisions of 
Republican judges are strongly in favor of the government position, while Democratic judges 
are more evenly divided, it may be tempting to conclude that the very conservative Republican 
District Court judges are biased while the more even-handed Democrats are not.  This 
conclusion is not justified.  In fact, we are not able to say whether the Democrats or 
Republicans are right or wrong when deciding the law in these cases, or that the judges in one 
party are more biased than the other.  The only claim this evidence supports is that there is a 
substantial and statistically significant difference between the outcomes in cases decided by 
judges appointed by Democratic presidents and cases decided by judges appointed by 
Republicans, with Republican judges upholding the government position more frequently.    
The second hypothesis to be tested is that Federal District Court judges are more likely 
to favor the government in Patriot Act cases where the Court of Appeals that would be 
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expected to review the decision has a majority of judges appointed by a Republican president 
rather than a Democratic president. The results of the test, displayed in Table 4, show a 
moderate but statistically significant relationship between the majority political makeup of 
Federal Courts of Appeals judges and the outcome of the Federal Court case.  Specifically, 
judges in Republican-dominated circuits favor the government position more frequently than 
circuits with a majority of Democrats on the Court of Appeals.  The Chi Square statistic is 
significant at the .036 level, indicating a 3.6 percent probability the result could have occurred 
by chance.  This is considerably below the threshold of .05.  The Phi test of association 
produced a value of .293, indicating a moderate relationship.   
 
Table 4 shows that District Court judges sitting in Republican-dominated circuits ruled in 
favor of the government 80 percent of the time, while judges in District Courts where the 
Federal Courts of Appeals had a majority of Democrat-appointed judges did so 52.4 percent of 
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the time.  Thus, for District Court judges under Republican-dominated Courts of Appeals, the 
odds of supporting the government are 3.7 times as large as the odds for District Court judges 
within Democratic dominated Courts of Appeals6.   These results suggest that the majority 
makeup of a Court of Appeal has an effect on the outcome of District Court cases involving the 
Patriot Act and supports the second hypothesis, which predicts District Courts are more likely to 
rule favorably towards the government if the Court of Appeal holds a majority of Republican 
appeals judges.   
To summarize the results to this point, when the relationships are tested independently, 
both District Court Party and Court of Appeals Majority appear to have an effect on the 
Outcome of District Court case, and both relationships are statistically significant.  A new 
question arises from this observation.  Though District Court Party and Court of Appeals 
Majority separately appear to influence the outcome of a District Court case, the relative 
contribution each independent variable makes to the outcome of a District Court case is not 
known.  In what follows, I attempt to explore this question.   
 Answering this question requires the use of multivariate, or multiple regression.  
Multivariate regression is a statistical technique that uses more than one independent, or, 
“causal” variable to make predictions (Fullerton, Maltby, and Miller 2009).  In fact, multiple 
regression  tests, “…The extent to which each independent variable x will play a part in 
predicting what the most likely value of the dependent variable y will be” (Fullerton et al.; 212).  
Essentially, a multiple regression tests how much the dependent variable y changes when the 
independent variables x move up or down by one unit (Torres-Reyna Online).   
                                                          
6
 Odds Ratio 
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A multiple regression equation reads, y = a + b1x1 + b2x2…etc.  The y represents the 
dependent variable, x1 and x2 represent the independent variables, b1 and b2 represent the 
coefficients, and “a” symbolizes the constant, which is, “…The value y is predicted to have when 
all independent variables are equal to zero” (Princeton Online).  The coefficients, or the “b” 
values, explain the size of increase or decrease when the independent variable increases by one 
unit, when all other independent variables are held constant (Princeton Online).   
 One of the assumptions of linear regression is that the dependent variable should be 
either interval or ratio-level and be unrestricted in its range.  In the case of a dichotomous 
dependent variable, however, this assumption is violated and the use of linear regression is 
inappropriate. In essence, the regression predicts the probability or odds that the dependent 
variable will take on a value of 1. The linear model may produce probability estimates that are 
less than zero or greater than one, which are logically impossible, and the use of linear 
regression for a dichotomous dependent variable will lead to misleading results. 
 Instead, this study will employ logistic regression to test the relative contribution each 
independent variable makes to the outcome of a District Court case.  Logistic regression is 
similar to linear regression, using one or more independent, or “causal” variables to make 
predictions.  The difference, however, lies with the logistic regression’s ability to test 
relationships where the dependent variable is dichotomous (Fullerton et al. 2009).  Unlike 
linear regression, the logistic regression addresses the problem of restricted range by 
transforming the odds usually produced by a multiple regression into log-odds.  Using the log 
odds allows the analysis to, “…Map probability ranging between 0 and 1 to log odds ranging 
from negative infinity to positive infinity” (UCLA Online). 
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Logistic regression is similar to linear regression.  The difference lies with the logistic 
regression’s ability to analyze a relationship with a dichotomous dependent variable by turning 
the probability prediction into a prediction using log odds.  Because logistic regression 
coefficients represent the change in the log odds of the dependent variable produced by a unit 
change in the independent variable, they are difficult to interpret.  Fortunately, the coefficients 
can also be represented as odds ratios, which are more easily understood.   
  Results from the logistic regression are presented in Table 5.  The coefficients, which are 
expressed as odds ratios, are 3.4 for District Court Party and 2.5 for Court Appeals Majority, 
indicating that when the independent variables take on a value of 1 rather than zero, the odds 
of a conservative outcome increases by 3.4 and 2.5 respectively (Princeton Online). It is worth 
noting that the coefficients have the right signs, in that the odds ratios are both positive and 
greater than 1.  The odds ratios produced in the regression analysis are also reasonable in 
magnitude and are relatively similar in size to the odds ratios produced from the results of the 
first and second cross-tabulation.   However, the large standard errors relative to the 
coefficients means that the coefficients for both District Court Party and Court of Appeals 
Majority are not significant at conventional levels7.  
  
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Stata was used in conducting the logistic regression. 
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These results are somewhat puzzling.  When tested separately, using cross-tabulation 
analysis (shown in Tables 3 and 4), both independent variables yielded strong and statistically 
significant relationships with the dependent variable.  When tested together, however, the 
relationship between the two independent variables and the dependent variable is 
insignificant. 
 The insignificant results are likely due to some combination of two related factors: a 
relatively small sample size and co-linearity among the independent variables.  Prior research 
has shown while using multiple regression analysis, there should be 10 cases for every 1 
independent variable (Barlett, Higgins, and Kotrlik 2001).  If independent variables have less 
than 10 cases, there is a risk that the results of the regression are too specific to the sample, 
and therefore, the results are not generalizable (Barlett et al. 2001).  Although there are 25.5 
cases per 1 independent variable in this analysis, adding the problem of co-linearity may 
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increase the number of cases required for each independent variable to yield significant results.  
Co-linearity exists between two independent variables when the two predictor variables are 
more correlated with one another than with the dependent variable (Princeton Online). It 
becomes difficult for the regression to, “…Interpret the valid unique effect of each variable on a 
dependent variable” (Fullerton et. al. 2009; 353).  In other words, it is, “…Impossible to 
determine which of the variables accounts for variance in the dependent variable” (Princeton 
Online).   The two independent variables, District Court Party and Court of Appeals Majority, 
may simply be too closely related for the logistic regression to produce statistically significant 
results. In order to test whether the insignificant coefficients in the logistic regression may 
bedue to a close relationship between the independent variables, a cross-tabulation between 
District Court Party and Court of Appeals Majority was conducted.  As presented in Table 6, the 
relationship between the two variables is strong, and statistically significant.  A Chi-Square 
report produced a significance level of .015, indicating a 1.5 percent probability the relationship 
could have occurred by chance.  The Phi test of association produced a value of .342, signifying 
a strong relationship.  Judges with Democratic Party Affiliations were under majority 
Democratic Courts of Appeals 57.7 percent of the time, compared to being under majority 
Republican Courts of Appeals 42.3 percent of the time.  Judges with Republican party 
affiliations were under Republican dominated Courts of Appeals 76 percent of the time, 
compared to being under Democratic dominated Courts of Appeals 24 percent of the time.  This 
finding indicates Republican judges are 3.2 times more likely to serve under Republican Courts 
of Appeals than Democrats. 
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Thus, District Court Party and Court of Appeals Majority are closely correlated.  This co-
linearity would explain the insignificant results produced by the logistic regression.  The overlap 
makes it impossible for the regression analysis to determine whether judicial party affiliation or 
the majority makeup a Court of Appeals has more of an effect on the outcome of a case.   
In order to look deeper into the relationships between the two predictor variables and 
dependent variable, a cross-tabulation between Court of Appeals Majority, and Outcome of 
District Court Cases was conducted with Judge’s Party acting as the control variable.  Table 7 
shows the relationship between case outcome and Court of Appeals majority for Democratic 
District Court judges, and Table 8 shows the relationship for Republican Judges.  These tables 
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allow one to see the effect of Court of Appeals on Outcome separately for Democratic and 
Republican judges. 
 The Chi square statistics for both tables are insignificant, likely due to low counts in 
some cells.  
 
As shown in Table 7, there are only three cases in the cell of Majority Republican and 
Unfavorable District Court Outcome.  Table 8 shows that there is only one case in the cell of 
Majority Democrat and Unfavorable to the Government, and only three cases in the cell of 
Majority Republican and Unfavorable Outcome.  These low cell counts are due to a 
combination of a relatively small sample size and the fact that the observations are unevenly 
distributed across the cells, especially for Republican judges.  This is also the likely explanation 
for a lack of statistical significance of the coefficients in the logistic regression in Table 5.  Prior 
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research has shown when Chi-Square statistic is employed, the expected value of each cell 
should be five or more. If the values are too low, the Chi-Square is likely to yield insignificant 
results (Analysis Factor Online). 
 
Although the relationships lack statistical significance, it is interesting to note the 
patterns in the data.  As shown in Table 7, when a District Court Judge is a Democrat, they 
support the government 40 percent of the time when the Court of Appeals is Democratic, but 
73 percent of the time when the Court of Appeals is Republican.  Thus, for Democratic District 
Court Judges, it seems as though the party of the Court of Appeals matters quite a bit in their 
decision making process.   
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On the other hand, Republican District Court Judges ruled in favor of the government 83 
percent of the time when the Court of Appeals was Democratic, and a nearly identical 84 
percent of the time when the Court of Appeals was Republican.  Thus, in contrast to the result 
for Democratic judges, the majority party on the Court of Appeals does not seem to matter for 
Republicans.  The lack of statistical significance between the relationships presented in Tables 7 
and 8 make it impossible to draw any solid conclusions.  Nonetheless, it is interesting to 
speculate on the possible reasons for this difference. 
As discussed above, it appears that Democratic District Court judges support the 
government at a considerably higher rate when the Court of Appeals majority is Republican.  It 
would be possible that Democratic judges have a greater fear of being reversed by a majority 
Court of Appeals of the opposite party than do Republican District Court judges.  Democratic 
District Court judges may also consider the conservative United States Supreme Court.  A recent 
study by Lee Epstein and Andrew Martin suggests the Roberts court has been the most 
conservative court since the 1930s (NY Times Online). Their fear of reversal from the Supreme 
Court could be large enough for Democratic judges to curtail their ideological preferences 
where Republicans do not.    
On the other hand, Republican judges support the government at a high rate regardless 
of the majority of the Court of Appeals.  Though it is possible that Republican judges are more 
ideologically committed than Democrats, one can speculate that Republican judges do not have 
as great of a fear of reversal as Democratic judges, due to the conservative Supreme Court.  If a 
Republican judge’s decision were to be appealed to a majority Democratic Court of Appeals, the 
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judge knows that the Supreme Court may uphold his/her ideological position.  Thus, the 
strategic anticipatory effect may not be as strong for Republican judges as it is for Democratic 
judges. 
CONCLUSION 
 The objective of this study was to explore the factors that determine federal District 
Court judges’ decisions on cases involving the USA PATRIOT ACT.  I hypothesized that both 
ideology and strategic anticipation would play a role in the judicial decision making process.   
Results indicate a statistically significant relationship between Federal District Court 
judges’ party and the outcome of the District Court case.  Specifically, Republican appointed 
judges’ ideologies as measured are more likely to rule in favor of the government in cases 
involving the Patriot Act.  The analysis also uncovered a statistically significant relationship 
between the majority political makeup of Federal Courts of Appeals judges, and the outcome of 
the Federal Court case.  District Court judges were more likely to rule in favor of the U.S. 
Government in cases involving the Patriot Act if they were under a conservative Court of 
Appeals. 
 Thus, results indicate ideology and strategic anticipation have an effect on the judicial 
decisions of U.S. District Court judges.  This finding is consistent with prior research.   Due to 
statistical issues of co-linearity and sample size, however, the present study cannot determine 
whether ideology or strategic anticipation has more of an effect on the outcomes of District 
Court decisions involving the Patriot Act.  Determining whether ideology or strategic 
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anticipation has more of an effect on Patriot Act cases may be possible in the future if more 
cases are included in the analysis.  Until then, however, it is impossible to draw any solid 
conclusions.     
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